Details

• Iraqi economic expert Ziad al-Hashemi says the current anti-corruption campaign cannot be separated from the financial pressure facing the Iraqi government.
• According to al-Hashemi, the steady flow of oil revenues under previous governments allowed corruption to remain a postponed or politically managed file, shaped by interests and power calculations.
• The current government, he argues, came to power in a different environment: regional war tensions, disruption to part of Iraq’s oil exports, a nearly depleted treasury and major spending obligations.
• Under those conditions, al-Hashemi says, the government had few options but to try to recover some of the public funds stolen over the past years.
• He views the campaign as an unprecedented step since 2003, but still below the required level as long as it targets the “tools of corruption” rather than the “sponsors of corruption.”
• Al-Hashemi warns that if the political and administrative sponsors of corruption remain beyond accountability, the system will be able to reproduce itself. Every time one tool falls, the networks protecting it can simply replace it with another.
• In its first official response, Iraq’s Federal Integrity Commission said it had begun implementing judicial arrest warrants against several suspects accused of violating public funds.
• The commission said the measures were the result of coordination among the judicial, executive and legislative authorities, stressing that all procedures were being carried out under the law.
• According to the Iraqi News Agency, the campaign covered 47 suspects, including lawmakers and officials, based on statements given by Deputy Oil Minister Adnan al-Jumaili, with pursuit operations continuing in Baghdad and other provinces.
• Sources from the Integrity Commission told +ontime that the Karkh Second Court had summoned a first-tier political figure to appear and give testimony after the figure’s name surfaced in preliminary investigations involving a suspect who is a member of Iraq’s parliament.
• The source said the summons was a routine legal procedure and did not amount to a direct accusation, adding that the request was sent under Iraq’s Code of Criminal Procedure.
• The source expected the political figure to avoid appearing for now, but said it was still more likely that the figure would eventually provide testimony.
• Asked about leaked images showing raids on suspects’ homes and seized items, the source said some of the leaks were the result of individual mistakes, while some circulated images were “not real.”
• Images of suspects and cash piles had spread widely on social media, with users claiming they were seized from the homes of those targeted. One image showed bundles of $100 bills allegedly linked to one of the accused women.
• Politically, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki emerged with a public show of support for the campaign. In a post on X addressed to Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi and the judiciary, he wrote: “We congratulate you on the Dawn Campaign to pursue the corrupt who tampered with the Iraqi people’s money,” adding: “Continue this mission until the end.”
• Maliki also described the campaign as “a long-awaited step for the Iraqi people,” declaring support for strengthening justice and holding accountable those who abused public trust.
• But Maliki’s position triggered broad reaction because his name has long been at the center of political and public accusations related to corruption and mismanagement of public funds during his time in power, although no final judicial ruling has established his personal responsibility in those cases.
• The corruption file during Maliki’s years in office remains a recurring subject in Iraqi political debate, with reports and analyses pointing to major losses in public funds during that period. Much of the criticism, however, has remained within the political and media sphere rather than being settled by final court judgments against him.
• In that context, it was notable that Maliki’s X account limited replies to the post, displaying a message that only some accounts could respond. The restriction came at a moment when the post was expected to draw criticism from Iraqi users who associate his name with corruption and mismanagement.
• The current campaign is one of the widest moves against politicians and officials in Iraq in recent years. It included raids in the Green Zone and arrests of political and parliamentary figures linked to corruption investigations that began with the detention of Adnan al-Jumaili.

What’s next?

The campaign places Iraq’s government before an early and sensitive test. If the measures remain confined to corruption tools and some executive fronts, they may end as a limited political pressure wave.

But if investigations expand toward the sponsors of corruption and the networks that provided political and administrative protection for years, the campaign could become a defining moment in the Iraqi state’s relationship with public money.

The key question now is whether the government and judiciary can carry the campaign through, or whether it will stop at the limits of the political balances that have long protected Iraq’s corruption system.

The post Corruption in Iraq: Financial Crisis Pushes Baghdad to Reopen Heavy Files appeared first on Ontime+.

• Baghdad witnessed one of its most significant political arrest campaigns in years early Sunday, after Iraqi forces raided targets inside the Green Zone and detained politicians, lawmakers and government officials.
• The arrests reportedly included seven people, among them five members of parliament, after parliamentary immunity was lifted for some of those targeted.
• Some wanted figures reportedly escaped before security forces arrived, prompting authorities to close Green Zone entrances and expand search operations. More arrests could follow in the coming days.
• Iraq’s Karkh Second Investigative Court is reviewing accusations linked to around 17 people, including lawmakers, officials and political figures.
• The names circulating include Muthana al-Samarrai, Alia Nassif, Mohammed al-Karbouli, Mohammed al-Sayhud, Wasit Governor Mohammed al-Mayahi, Bahaa al-Nouri, Mudar al-Karwi, Ibrahim al-Sumaidaie, Hassan al-Khafaji, Ali Maarij al-Bahadli, Hussein Muanis, Hind al-Abbasi, Alaa Sukkar al-Dulaimi and Ziyad al-Janabi.
• Hasan’s reading pushes back against claims that the raids amount to a “coup.” He argues that such a description exaggerates both the scale of the operation and the political weight of those targeted.
• Most of the names, according to Hasan, sit in Iraq’s second or third political tier. Even al-Samarrai, the most prominent figure among those mentioned, is not indispensable to the ruling equation.
• Hasan also casts doubt on the Iran angle. Most of the names being discussed are Sunni politicians, officials or state functionaries. The Shiite figures involved are not viewed as core pro-Iran actors or figures closely tied to the IRGC.
• That makes the “Iran targeting its rivals” frame weaker than a more familiar Iraqi story: competition over power, leverage and state resources.
• Although some reports have linked the raids directly to Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, Hasan notes that arrest warrants against figures of this stature are unlikely to be issued without approval from senior levels of Iraq’s judiciary.
• In that sense, Zaidi may be overseeing the campaign, or benefiting politically from it, rather than being its sole architect.
• The broader backdrop began weeks ago with the detention of Adnan al-Jumaili, the deputy oil minister for refining affairs, in one of the highest-profile corruption cases since Zaidi took office.
• Politically, some of those targeted are linked to the bloc of former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, whose list won the largest number of seats in November’s elections before he was pushed out of the premiership by deadlock inside the Coordination Framework.
• That makes Sudani, in Hasan’s reading, the most visible loser so far. But it is still too early to draw firm conclusions.
• The campaign comes at a sensitive moment for Zaidi’s government, which was formed in May after parliament approved a partial cabinet. His administration is already facing pressure over corruption, the economy, relations with Washington and Tehran, and the role of armed factions.
• Zaidi is also expected to visit Washington in July to strengthen economic and trade ties with the United States, while trying to present himself as a leader capable of restoring state authority and attracting investment.
• The campaign may therefore serve a dual purpose: judicial in form, political in effect. It gives the new government a chance to project seriousness at home and abroad, while also reshuffling power balances inside Iraq’s political class.
• Iraq’s recent history warrants caution. New governments often begin with anti-corruption drives, only for those campaigns to lose momentum or become bargaining chips among rival factions.
• What may make this episode different, Hasan argues, is the apparent backing from senior layers of the judiciary and the broader context of mounting economic and external pressure.

What’s next?

The key questions now are whether the judiciary will publish clear charges, whether investigations will reach first-tier political figures, and whether the process will remain a legal track or turn into a negotiable political message.

If the campaign expands beyond mid-level names and reaches major financial and contracting networks, it could give Zaidi early legitimacy and redraw the limits of impunity in Iraq.

If it stops at a limited wave of arrests, it will likely be remembered as another round of elite competition rather than a turning point in the fight against corruption.

Source

The post Baghdad’s Dawn Raids: Anti-Corruption Drive or Elite Power Play? appeared first on Ontime+.

Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has entered an early confrontation with Iran-backed armed groups after ordering all militias to submit to state authority, in what is widely seen as the defining test of his government since taking office in late April.

According to The New York Times, the move follows mounting pressure from the Trump administration, which has urged Baghdad to reduce Iranian influence and dismantle armed groups operating outside government control in exchange for continued U.S. financial and security support.

Details

• Al-Zaidi ordered all armed factions to come under the government’s chain of command. Several influential groups, including Kataib Hezbollah, rejected the directive, arguing that ending what they describe as U.S. interference in Iraq should take priority.
• In contrast, Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr said his Peace Brigades (Saraya al-Salam) would fully integrate into Iraq’s official security forces, giving the prime minister an important political boost. The pledge, however, does not include the strongest Iran-aligned factions.
• The Trump administration argues that armed groups operating outside state authority threaten Iraq’s sovereignty and regional stability. That position was reflected in a joint statement issued after al-Zaidi met U.S. envoy Tom Barrack, reaffirming plans to disarm and dissolve all armed formations outside government control.
• Analysts remain skeptical that Baghdad can fully implement those commitments, noting that several militias maintain deep political influence and institutional ties that make integration or dismantlement far more complicated than issuing government orders.

Background

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) were established in 2014 after Iraq’s highest Shiite religious authority called for volunteers to fight ISIS. Parliament later recognized the PMF as a state institution, but several factions—particularly those closely aligned with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—retained independent command structures and military capabilities.

Successive Iraqi governments have repeatedly pledged to place all weapons under state control, but those efforts have largely failed because of the political and military influence of powerful armed groups.

U.S. pressure has intensified following renewed regional tensions with Iran. Washington accuses several Iraqi militias of attacking American personnel and facilities, while those groups say they are resisting the U.S. military presence in Iraq.

Many observers believe al-Zaidi faces a more difficult environment than his predecessors, as Washington increasingly ties its partnership with Baghdad to reforms aimed at strengthening Iraqi sovereignty and ending the existence of armed groups operating outside state authority.

What to watch

The coming weeks will show whether al-Zaidi can translate his promises into concrete action or whether resistance from powerful militias will trigger another political and security confrontation, with significant consequences for Iraq’s ties with both Washington and Tehran.

The post Iraq’s New Prime Minister Faces His Toughest Test Against Iran-Backed Militias appeared first on Ontime+.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has opened debate on two of the country’s most contentious files, saying his government would consider suspending Iraq’s membership in OPEC if current production restrictions continue, while also committing to disarm militias before the end of September.

Speaking to journalist Hadley Gamble, al-Zaidi said Iraq should be allowed to fully utilize its oil production capacity, arguing that continued limits could force Baghdad to reconsider its position within the oil producers’ group.

He also said his government aims to eliminate weapons outside state control by September 30, a deadline that coincides with the planned withdrawal of the last U.S. troops from Iraq.

Details

• Al-Zaidi said U.S. companies would receive priority access to investment opportunities in Iraq.

• He said Baghdad is prepared to allocate 500,000 barrels of oil per day to help replenish the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

• The prime minister pledged to continue a broad anti-corruption campaign, describing corruption as one of Iraq’s biggest economic and political challenges.

• The comments come ahead of an expected visit to Washington, where Iraq hopes to attract new U.S. investment and deepen economic cooperation.

Background

Iraq has long argued that OPEC production quotas do not reflect its full output potential, particularly after years of investment in its oil sector. Because the country’s economy remains heavily dependent on oil revenue, production limits carry significant political and economic consequences.

The militia issue remains one of the most difficult challenges facing any Iraqi government. Successive administrations have pledged to bring all weapons under state control, but powerful armed groups continue to wield substantial political and security influence.

Analysts say progress on the militia file will be closely watched in Washington and Gulf capitals as a key test of Baghdad’s ability to strengthen state authority and attract larger foreign investments.

What to watch

Any move by Baghdad to challenge OPEC’s quota system would mark one of the most significant shifts in Iraqi oil policy in years. At the same time, al-Zaidi’s pledge to disarm militias within months will be an early test of whether his government can translate ambitious promises into action.

The post Iraq Signals Possible OPEC Exit as PM Pledges to Disarm Militias appeared first on Ontime+.

As some Iraqi factions discuss handing their weapons to the state, reports point to a quieter and more sensitive development: small clandestine groups operating directly under the supervision of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards rather than through established proxy organizations.

Eight Iraqi sources said the Revolutionary Guards set up several covert cells in recent months to launch drone attacks against Gulf countries hosting U.S. forces. The effort appears designed to preserve Iranian influence while reducing reliance on well-known militia networks.

According to the sources, each cell consists of a small number of fighters with expertise in drone operations and communications. They reportedly answer directly to the Revolutionary Guards rather than the command structure of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.

Details

• The sources said the cells carried out or attempted attacks against targets in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates between April and May, operating from desert areas in southern Iraq.

• Iraqi security officials believe the use of smaller, secretive groups gives Tehran greater deniability while reducing political pressure on established Iran-backed factions.

• The reports come as prominent groups, including Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali, have announced steps to place their weapons under state authority, in what many see as one of Baghdad’s most significant efforts to consolidate control over arms.

• Iraq has faced growing U.S. pressure in recent months to curb the influence of armed groups operating outside state institutions, while Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has pledged to strengthen the government’s monopoly on weapons.

• Relations between Iraq and several Gulf states have also come under strain following allegations that drone attacks originated from Iraqi territory, prompting official protests from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

Why it matters

If the reports are accurate, they point to a shift in Iran’s strategy inside Iraq. Rather than relying entirely on large, well-known militias that face increasing scrutiny, Tehran may be moving toward smaller, more agile, and less costly networks.

Such a model could allow Iran to maintain regional leverage even if Baghdad succeeds in dismantling or integrating parts of the traditional militia infrastructure into state institutions.

What to watch

The key question is whether Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s government can identify and disrupt these networks before they become a permanent feature of Iraq’s security landscape.

Success could strengthen Baghdad’s relations with Gulf states. Failure, and any future attacks launched from Iraqi territory, could reignite regional tensions and increase pressure on the Iraqi government.

The post Iran’s Shadow Cells Reach the Gulf Through Iraq appeared first on Ontime+.

Attention is turning to Washington as Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi prepares for a visit to the United States in July, while reports indicate Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa may also be planning a trip to the White House.

The developments come as President Donald Trump’s administration reassesses its regional priorities and looks to strengthen political and economic partnerships across the Middle East.

According to Rudaw, economic and investment issues will dominate al-Zaidi’s discussions in Washington, alongside broader strategic relations between Baghdad and the United States.

The visit carries particular significance for al-Zaidi, who took office only months ago after a prolonged political deadlock following Iraq’s 2025 elections.

Details

• Baghdad is seeking greater U.S. investment and deeper economic cooperation as a central pillar of its government agenda.

• Iraq continues to face economic pressure linked to regional instability and disruptions affecting trade and energy routes.

• The Iraqi government is also attempting to curb the influence of Iran-backed armed groups, increasing its need for political and economic support from Washington.

• Reports suggest Ahmad al-Sharaa is considering a White House visit as Damascus seeks to capitalize on improving ties with the Trump administration and efforts to ease sanctions on Syria.

• Syria is looking to attract foreign investment and accelerate reconstruction projects while promoting regional energy, transport, and trade initiatives.

• U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack oversees both the Iraqi and Syrian files, giving Washington a unified diplomatic channel for engagement with the two countries.

• The diplomatic activity comes as the international coalition’s mission against ISIS nears its conclusion in both Iraq and Syria, potentially opening a new phase focused on economic development and regional stability.

Iraq and Syria in Washington’s Calculations

The emerging diplomatic track appears to be about more than routine bilateral meetings.

Baghdad is seeking to rebalance its foreign relationships and reduce dependence on Iran, while Damascus is attempting to reposition itself as a credible regional economic and political partner.

At the same time, the Trump administration is working to demonstrate that it can stabilize Iraq and Syria while pursuing a broader understanding with Tehran. That gives the potential visits significance beyond traditional diplomacy.

What to watch

The key question is whether Washington’s approach will remain focused on economic support or evolve into a broader regional strategy designed to reduce Iranian influence and integrate Iraq and Syria into new economic and security frameworks backed by the United States and its partners.

The post As Iran Fades, Trump Turns to Baghdad and Damascus! appeared first on Ontime+.

The latest

Kadim Al Sahir’s appearance on ABtalks worked best as a human portrait.

The conversation gave viewers a softer, more personal version of the Iraqi singer. It moved through childhood memories, family ties, love, loss and the emotional experiences that shaped him away from the stage.

That approach served the episode well. It deepened the audience’s emotional connection with Al Sahir and reinforced the public image of an artist whose appeal has always gone beyond voice and melody.

But it also left a gap.

The interview did not fully use the opportunity to revisit Al Sahir as a major musical figure. It touched the man more than the artist. It opened emotional doors, but left the creative archive largely closed.

Details

• The episode gave Al Sahir space to speak with calm, sincerity and emotional ease.

• It strengthened his media image as a beloved public figure with a personal story that still resonates.

• The strongest moments came when the conversation moved through family, early life, love and personal vulnerability.

• The weaker side was the limited attention given to his artistic method, his relationship with poetry and his evolution as a composer.

• For an artist of Al Sahir’s stature, the interview could have gone further into how he shaped modern Arabic romantic song.

• It also could have explored his long partnership with classical Arabic poetry, his choices as a composer and the reasons his music has remained alive across generations.

• Editorially, the episode reflects a wider media preference for personal storytelling that is easy to share and emotionally accessible.

• That approach works with large audiences, but it can flatten the artistic legacy of major cultural figures.

What to watch

The question now is whether future interviews with Al Sahir will move beyond the familiar emotional frame.

His personal story matters. But his artistic story matters just as much.

Kadim Al Sahir is not only a beloved singer with a moving life. He is one of the central architects of Arabic romantic music over the past four decades.

A fuller conversation would need to hold both truths together: the man audiences love, and the artist whose work still defines a major chapter in Arab music.

Source: +ontime monitoring.

The post Kadim Al Sahir on ABtalks: A strong human portrait, but an unfinished artistic reading! appeared first on Ontime+.

Iraq and the UAE are moving to expand oil export routes outside the Strait of Hormuz as they seek to limit the impact of disruptions along one of the world’s most important energy corridors. Analysts warn, however, that existing and planned alternatives will not be enough to replace the full volume of oil that once flowed through the strait.

Details

• Abu Dhabi is accelerating work on a new pipeline to Fujairah, a project expected to begin operations in 2027 and significantly expand ADNOC’s export capacity outside the Strait of Hormuz.

• Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan called in May for the project to be completed more quickly to meet growing global energy demand.

• While the UAE retains an alternative export outlet through Fujairah, energy infrastructure across the region remains vulnerable to security threats and attacks.

• The International Energy Agency estimates that alternative pipelines in Saudi Arabia and the UAE provide between 3.5 million and 5.5 million barrels per day of spare capacity, compared with roughly 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products that moved through Hormuz daily before the war.

• Building new export routes requires major investment, cross-border agreements and years of construction.

• Iraq’s cabinet last week approved plans to accelerate exports through the Kurdistan-Turkey pipeline network, potentially increasing capacity from 220,000 barrels per day to 770,000 barrels per day.

• The route provides access to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, offering Baghdad an export corridor that bypasses the Gulf.

• Data from QuantCube Technology showed a sharp decline in Iraqi exports since the war began, reflecting the country’s heavy dependence on the Strait of Hormuz.

• QuantCube chief economist Alan Le Maignan said Iraq faces a more difficult situation than the UAE or Saudi Arabia because it has fewer options to reroute exports.

• Baghdad said in May that it exported about 10 million barrels through Hormuz in April, down from 93 million barrels before the conflict.

What to watch

The pace of pipeline expansion projects will determine how effectively Gulf producers can adapt to prolonged disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. But securing those alternative routes may prove just as important as building them.

The post UAE and Iraq Accelerate Oil Export Alternatives as Hormuz Disruptions Persist appeared first on Ontime+.

Washington is monitoring the movement of Iraqi factions listed under U.S. terrorism and sanctions measures, as travel between Iraq and Lebanon increases and concerns grow over the possible use of flights to move personnel or money under humanitarian cover.

A security source at Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport told +ontime that the airport has recently seen a noticeable rise in arrivals linked to Iraqi factions. Some, the source said, carry service passports. Others present themselves as bringing aid for displaced people.

The source said some arrivals invoke the name of “Muqtada al-Sadr” or humanitarian work linked to Hezbollah’s social environment to reduce suspicion. The source added that some of the arrivals are Iranians carrying Iraqi passports and large amounts of cash, which they say is meant for displaced families.

Details

• Factions under U.S. designation: Washington has listed Asaib Ahl al-Haq as a foreign terrorist organization since 2020. It has also designated Harakat al-Nujaba among Iran-aligned Iraqi groups it says were involved in attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and bases hosting U.S. and coalition forces.

• Flights under scrutiny: The airport security source said direct flights between Iraq and Beirut by Middle East Airlines, Iraqi Airways and UR Airlines rose from around 14 flights a week to higher levels, reaching about 28 weekly flights in some periods. Most flights came from Baghdad, Najaf and Basra.

• Possible humanitarian cover: According to the source, Lebanese and U.S.-linked security channels are watching the possible use of aid for displaced people as cover for the movement of personnel or money tied to Iraqi factions.

• Rene Mouawad Airport: The source said Washington is pressing for the reopening of Rene Mouawad Airport in northern Lebanon. Officially, the move is presented as a way to ease pressure on Beirut airport and expand civil aviation capacity. But it now carries an added security dimension because of concerns over concentrating all air arrivals in one airport.

• Iraqi airports after the collapse of the land route: In Baghdad, an informed source said the U.S. side expressed concern over the appointment of a figure close to the IRGC as transport minister. The concern, the source said, is that Iraqi airports could become an air link between the IRGC and Hezbollah after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the disruption of the land route through Syria.

• Promises from the prime minister’s office: According to the same source, Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi told the U.S. side that his office would directly oversee civil aviation and limit IRGC influence over Iraqi airports. Washington also asked for a known and credible figure to be appointed to manage Iraq’s civil aviation authority.

• Iraq’s Transport Ministry: Iraq’s parliament voted to appoint Wahb Salman Mohammed al-Hassani as transport minister. Hassani is a former military officer and a member of the Badr Organization, one of Iraq’s Iran-aligned forces. The source said IRGC Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani had insisted on Hassani taking the post during a visit before the government was formed.

Why it matters

This is not just about normal travel between two countries. The core U.S. concern is that the Iraq-Lebanon air route could become an alternative to the land corridor that once linked Iran to Hezbollah through Syria.

If the sources’ assessments are accurate, Iraqi factions may be trying to use humanitarian cover, service passports and multiple airlines to keep a political and financial support line open into Lebanon.

What to watch

The key indicator is the volume and profile of flights arriving in Beirut from Baghdad, Najaf and Basra, along with the money or cargo moving under the label of humanitarian aid.

The post Washington monitors movement of sanctioned Iraqi factions toward Lebanon appeared first on Ontime+.

Muqtada al-Sadr has reopened one of Iraq’s most sensitive files: the future of armed factions outside direct state control.

Sadr announced that Saraya al-Salam would break fully from the National Shiite Movement and come under the state and its official military authorities.

He said the decision was made in the national interest and to avoid risks facing the country. He also urged other Popular Mobilization factions to break away from partisan and sectarian command structures.

Sadr said civilian bodies linked to Saraya al-Salam would be reorganized under Al-Bunyan al-Marsous, without offices, weapons, uniforms or other organizational labels.

The decision puts the Iraqi state before a direct test: Can it absorb a major armed formation under one security command, or will the move remain more political than operational?

Details

• Saraya al-Salam was founded in June 2014 at Sadr’s call, after ISIS swept across large parts of Iraq. It initially presented itself as a force to protect holy sites and fight the group.

• The formation grew out of the Mahdi Army, which Sadr created after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq before later dissolving it.

• Saraya al-Salam fought ISIS in several battles, including Jurf al-Nasr, Tikrit, Samarra and Ishaqi Island.

• After ISIS was defeated, the group’s status returned to the center of Iraq’s debate over weapons outside state control.

• Sadr has repeatedly called for arms to be restricted to the state and has tied his position on Saraya al-Salam to a wider path that includes other factions.

• Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi welcomed the decision, calling it support for state authority and a step toward unified security command.

• Figures close to the Sadrist movement say placing Saraya al-Salam under the commander-in-chief is meant to unify military decision-making and prevent competing chains of command.

• The real challenge is not the announcement. It is the mechanism: Who controls the weapons? Who gives the orders? And how far can political loyalty be separated from military structure?

What to watch

The real test will be Saraya al-Salam’s conduct after the announcement, not the wording of Sadr’s statement.

If orders, funding and field movement shift genuinely to the state, Sadr’s move could become a precedent that pressures other factions. If political influence remains intact behind an official cover, the step will look more like repositioning than the end of party-linked arms.

The post Sadr hands Saraya al-Salam to the state in Iraq’s latest test over armed factions appeared first on Ontime+.